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CLOSE YOUR EYES

AND SWALLOW

The FDA deals a severe blow to patients' rights to
drug information.
Barbra A. Kavanaugh
In 1972, a baby girl was born with "severe and irreparable
brain damage and partial paralysis" after her mother -was
given an oral anti-coagulant which was "widely accepted in
the medical community" as being capable of crossing the
placental barrier. Her doctor was not aware of the risk,
because he did not read the physician's package insert that
warned of the danger and because the manufacturer had
withdrawn the drug from the Physician's Desk Reference

(PDR). The doctor had done no reading on his own on the
drug for five years and had assumed it to be safe, as it has
been originally marketed without the warning (Baker v. St.
Agnes Hospital, 70 A.D. 2d 400 [19791). On the other
hand, the patient package insert for Warfarin, an oral anticoagulant with the same capability, contains a warning in
bold print to pregnant women. If Ms. Baker had received
such an insert, she might have questioned her doctor and
avoided a tragedy.
Studies show that Ms. Baker's tragedy is not an isolated incident. Recent studies estimate that reactions to
new drugs, about which doctors and patients are poorly informed, have doubled the average duration of hospitalization at the cost of approximately $3 billion per year.
According to attorney Richard O'Meara:
Physicians now have pharmaceutical and biological
agents that can be used to destroy bacteria, thwart

viruses, imitate glands, change blood pressure, provoke diuresis (produce urine), alter heartbeat, retard
cancer, affect emotions, and perform many other
therapeutic acts that were previously impossible.
This powerful and specific technology ...creates
the unprecedented capacity to help and to harm.
There is a constant tension between our need and desire to cure and treat diseases and the costs of a rapidly
increasing technology to meet those needs and desires. We
may choose not to impose.strict liability on drug manufacturers because it will adversely effect incentive to develop
and market new drugs; yet we want to protect ourselves
from the risk of harm presented b these new and powerful
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drugs.
A system has developed to help us at least make informed and responsible decisions about the risks we are
willing to take in order to be "well." Yet this system is inadequate because of its ignorance of actual medical pracices and its dependence on a historical, but unjustified, view of the physician's role in sharing drug information.
One way to repair the system would be to make information directly available to the ultimate consumer/patient.
Such a program has been developing over the past twelve
years. Patient package inserts are brochures or pamphlets
included in the prescription drug package. They list, in
plain English, the major side effects, risks, and indications
for the drug.
The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has required patient package inserts (PPIs) for certain drugs since
1968. In 1980, the FDA issued a regulation that required
inserts for all prescription drugs, but initially implemented a
pilot program for only ten drugs. However, despite indications that PPIs did in fact increase patient awareness, compliance, and participation in their own treatment, Health
and Human Services Secretary Richard Schweiker issued a
statement on December 23, 1981, that the FDA intended
to withdraw the PPI regulation.
The final requirements for the preparation and distribution of patient package inserts (PPIs) were adopted by the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) on September 12,
1980. Although the regulations applied to all prescription
drugs and drug classes, the program was initially implemented for only ten drugs. The ten drugs included widely
used antibiotics, tranquilizers, and pain-killers, as well as an
oral anti-coagulant and a high-blood pressure medication.
All of the drugs in the pilot program can cause serious reactions or have an addictive potential and require the patient
to participate in reporting symptoms of either to the prescribing physician. The FDA intended to evaluate the limited implementation program in deciding whether to extend, revise, or defer these requirements.
The program followed more than ten years of FDA
experience with PPIs. As early as June 1968, the FDA required that inhalation products for asthma sufferers bear a
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two-sentence warning to the patient. Soon after that, the
FDA issued regulations requiring that certain information
be made available to patients about the use of oral contraceptives, intrauterine devices (IUD) and all estrogen-based
drug products.
FDA requirements for PPIs had centered on largely
elective prescription drug products which presented significant risks to patients. Following the development of patient
labeling requirements for oral contraceptives in 1970, the
FDA began evaluating the usefulness of PPIs for prescription drug products generally and studied alternative means
of presenting information to patients. The process gained
momentum in 1974 when the FDA, responding to suggestions from the National Food and Drug Advisory Committee, began a Pilot Prescription Drug Labeling Project to
investigate whether the FDA's PPI program should be expanded to apply to a variety of prescription drug products.
In March 1975, the Project received a petition from the
Center for Law and Social Policy on behalf of numerous
consumer and women's health organizations, suggesting the
use of written warnings to guide and benefit the patient
and recommending that such information be attached to the
prescription container. The FDA responded by soliciting
opinions from the public on issues extending beyond the
scope of the petition, including not only the advantages and
disadvantages of such regulations but also the scope, detail,
style, and method of distribution of such patient warnings.
Between September 1974 and June 1975, FDA officials
met individually with organizations representing doctors,
pharmacists, and the pharmaceutical industry and, in July
1975, met with consumer representatives to discuss the
general concept of PPIs. The FDA also hosted a series of
meetings in May and June 1976 in which officials met with
consumer advocates and representatives from the pharmaceutical industry, pharmacy associations, and allied health
professions. Later in 1976, the FDA invited the Drug Information Association, an independent nonprofit professional
group interested in drug information, to arrange a symposium on PPIs, which was attended by over seven hundred
health professionals, consumer representatives, and members of the press. The FDA continued to solicit public opinion and comment, and, in February 1979, the Institute of
Medicine of the National Academy of Sciences, under contract to the FDA, sponsored a public hearing, soliciting
comments on how PPIs should be objectively evaluated
once used on a widespread basis.In addition to ten years of public and private meetings,
the FDA reviewed literature and studies which indicated
that the distribution of printed drug information to patients
improves patient compliance. It ippeared that information

which increased the patient's knowledge of side effects and
contraindications helped the patient in taking drugs properly and improving decisions the patient made in monitoring
the course of treatment. These results are consistent with
the FDA's intent in requiring PPIs for prescription drugs,
which was to provide patients with information about prescription drug products that will promote their safe and ef,
fective uses and to provide patients with adequate and
meaningful information sufficient for them to participate in
evaluating the benefits, risks, and proper use of prescription
drug products.
The FDA's purpose in requiring PPIs was misinterpreted by Vice-President George Bush in a press release
issued on August 12, 1980. He questioned the utility of
PPIs in light of the fact that the decision to use a prescription drug is made before purchasing the drug, which is
when the patient would receive any information from the
PPI. The given purpose of the PPI program is not to influence consumer buying habits but to increase patient/
consumer knowledge of and participation in their own
treatment.
The Vice-President's press release, which slated the
PPI program for review, was followed by unofficial notification on February 20, 1981, to the drug and pharmaceutical
industries that the FDA would indefinitely stay the effective dates of the final PPI regulation. This indefinite stay
was imposed a little more than a year from the date that the
regulation was first issued.
After the unofficial notification to the drug industry,
three consumer and health organizations filed a suit against
the Department of Health and Human Services on April 8,
1981, seeking to compel implementation of the PPI program
according to the schedule established by the regulation.
The suit, filed by Public Citizen, the National Women's
Health Network and the National Council of Senior Citizens, charged that the Reagan Administration had failed to
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act by suspending the program indefinitely without public notice or
hearings.
In a memorandum opinion, the District Court for the
District of Columbia felt it necessary to "rely in the de
fendant's integrity and accept defendant's statement that
nothing more than a 'temporary stay' was contemplated,
rather than an 'indefinite suspension' as argued by the
plaintiffs." Accordingly, the court allowed the Administra,
tion to continue the stay, but limited it to six months. The
court agreed to entertain a motion to reopen the case in the
even that the stay extended beyond that time.
The court also noted that "it is probable that, when
the review has been completed, the current administration
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will endorse the views of its predecessors and issue the
regulations at issue without change." Former FDA Commissioner Jere E. Goyan was quoted by the court as saying
that "... they'll [the new administration's personnel)
realize that it is a logical and sensible approach, and they'll
allow it to go forward. After all, the PPI program is an experiment; the results should be evaluated before the program is abandoned."
On November 30, 1981, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia issued an order requiring the Secretary of HHS, Richard Schweiker, to decide
the fate of the PPI program by December 3 of that year.
Secretary Schweiker responded with a statement on
December 23 that the FDA intended to withdraw the PPI
regulation.

POSSIBLE REASONS FOR WITHDRAWAL
OF THE REGULATION
The Secretary's statement was no doubt prompted by the
hearings in September 1981, which were held by the FDA
as part of their review of the PPI program. The hearings
were attended by representatives of the American Medical
Association, the drug industry, and pharmacists' associations. These groups had been fairly acquiescent to the PPI
program in recent years, perhaps accepting the PPI program
as inevitable. However, they showed new strength in opposing the program at the September hearings, perhaps partially in response to the new Administration's weakened
commitment to the program.
The Board of Directors of the American Medical Association, which had issued a statement in favor of the program, was pressured by its membership to retract its endorsement. Unfortunately, the membership based its
opposition on erroneous assumptions about the program.
Many doctors believe that the inserts will be merely copies
of the highly technical and sophisticated physicians' inserts.
This is simply untrue. PPIs have been written specifically
for each drug, taking into account the individual problems
of the drug. For example, it is very important to finish a
prescription for antibiotics in order to avoid recurring infections. The PPIs for antibiotics stress this point. On the
other hand, a patient who is taking an oral anti-coagulant
must be aware of the increased risk of bleeding episodes.
The PPI for Narfarin, an oral anti-coagulant, encourages
the patient to report any unusual bleeding or bruising to
their physician. Yet most doctors do not realize how simple
and direct the PPIs are. This is an unfortunate consequence
of their experiences with the earlier PPIs for oral contracepI
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tives, which were highly technical and did in fact cause
problems with patient noncompliance and imagined side
effects. It is also a problem that is easily solved by increasing the physicians' awareness of the nature of the modern
PPI.
The drug industry takes no single position on the PPI
issue. Views differ from manufacturer to manufacturer and
drug to drug. Generally, manufacturers are less reluctant to
provide an insert with a drug which may cause major side
effects, yet is widely used, than a drug with relatively fewer serious side effects or one which is marketed to a small
population. However, manufacturers also realize that, although it is unlikely that a PPI requirement would substantially alter the manufacturer's liability by enabling them to
use an "assumption of risk" defense, it is very likely that,
by increasing patient awareness and compliance, that the
number of drug therapy injuries and related claims would
be decreased. In fact, G. D. Searle and Company, a leading
birth control device and drug manufacturer, has consistently written its own PPIs so that they go beyond the information required by the FDA, as an attempt to limit injury and
liability.
The pharmacists have been the most resistant to the
PPI program. Their arguments are primarily based on the
high costs of implementing the program, citing the costs of
storage and hours lost to labeling packages and explaining
the inserts. However, it is widely believed in the industry
that their position would change if the program would increase their status as members of the professional health
team-a status which they have been seeking for many
years. Professional status would be contingent upon the
professional health team members' acceptance of the phar,
macist as the patient's primary source of drug information.
As the patient would receive the insert from the pharmacist when he or she dispenses the drug, it would be the
pharmacist's responsibility to explain the insert and answer
any questions.
II
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"Historically, the doctor.-patient
relationship has been based on a
model of patient helplessness.
The FDA hearings this past September were followed
by Secretary Schweiker's withdrawal of FDA support from
the PPI program, despite the fact that, at the same hearings, Ms. Belita Cowan, Executive Director of the National
Women's Health Network, cited a three-year, $525,000
study which had been completed in August 1981 by the
Rand Corporation, under contract to the FDA. The study
involved 1,821 patients filling prescriptions at sixty-nine
pharmacies in Los Angeles, California. The Rand Corporation divided the patients into a control group which did not
receive PPIs and a test group which received PPIs for
erythromycin (an antibiotic), fluzepam (a sleeping pill), and
currently mandated PPIs for estrogens prescribed for menopausal symptoms. The study showed that the great majority of study participants read and understood the information contained in the PPIs. Moreover, Representative
Doug Walgren (D-Pennsylvania, Eighteenth District) said
that the study showed that the longer and more detailed
the information given, themore useful the PPI was to the
patient.
Although there are criticisms of the study, most notably that the participants were aware of their part in the
study and that they were paid $2.50 for responding to the
questionnaires about the PPIs, it remains the most authoritative study on the subject and is still cited with approval
by the FDA. In fact, the criticisms undermine at least one
complaint made by physicians about the PPI program.
Physicians are saying that, when this type of information is
given to patients, it will frighten them away from the drug
or cause imagined side effects, thereby decreasing patient
compliance. Yet, even though the design of the Rand study
may have induced patients to read the PPIs when they normally would not have done so, there was no increase in
complaints, nor was there any increase in the number of
prescriptions returned to the pharmacy. Patients in the test
group were actually more likely to actively participate in
and comply with their own treatment.
By ignoring the results of its own study, and seeming to
respond only to economic, cost-benefit-type arguments in
withdrawing FDA support from the PPI program, the new
Administration is lending sad and disturbing credence to
I
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the statement by Dr. Sidney Wolfe of the Health Research
Group that "the Department of Health and Human Serv,
ices is more responsive to the interests of the drug industry
than to the health needs of the American public."
Although the proposed withdrawal from the PPI program must still go through public hearings before the FDA,
it is unlikely that it will survive with the Administration's
support. If that is in fact the case, it will be the responsibility of the courts to safeguard patients' health and right to
drug information in the face of a growing drug technology
and actual medical practices. By establishing a rule requir,
ing manufacturers to warn the ultimate consumer/patient
in simple and direct language, patients will be able to participate in their own treatment and add an extra layer of information and protection to the present system as well.
There is a way in which the courts may provide such protection, and it can be derived from current drug manufacturer's products liability doctrine.

DRUG MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY
Generally
The majority of drugs today are purified chemicals, and the
amount of litigation resulting from the drug product being
unsanitary or contaminated with other chemical products is
relatively minimal. Most drug litigation occurs because the
product is inherently harmful. Although drugs may be
properly manufactured, it is not possible to design an effec,
tive but completely safe drug. Almost all drugs have the
potential to inflict serious harm; in fact, a degree of toxicity
is an essential element of an effective pharmaceutical.
In recognition of this fact, an exception to strict liability
was included in the Restatement of Torts 2d. Comment K
under §402A of the Restatement admits that "there are
some products which, in the present state of human knowl,
edge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially common in the
field of drugs." Accordingly,
[t]he seller of such products.., with the qualifica.
tion that they are properly prepared and marketed,
and proper warning is given, where the situation calls
for it,
is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because
he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with
a known but apparently reasonable risk. [emphasis
I
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added) (Restatement of Torts 2d, §402A, comment K,
1965)

Comment K does not free drug manufacturers from all
liability but rather applies a "risk/benefit" analysis. Because of the language of Comment K referring to an "apparently reasonable risk," the protection under Comment K is
lost if the drug which causes an injury has no substantial
benefit. Yet, the majority of drugs about which litigation
has arisen over the years are still marketed, which means
that the risk/benefit ratio of these drugs still favors marketing. The defect lies neither in the manufacturing nor in the
formulation but in the adequacy of the warning which accompanies the drugs. A drug marketed without warning of
known dangers is clearly defective, and the manufacturers
will be held strictly liable for any resulting injury.
Duty to Warn the Physician:Although the manufacturers of
most consumer goods have a duty to provide users with information necessary for the safe use of the product, the
drug manufacturer historically has been required to warn
only the prescribing physician as the physician stands as
the "learned intermediary" between the manufacturer and
the ultimate consumer. The courts continue to support this
exception to the strict liability doctrine in drug litigation.
There are only two instances where the ultimate consumer has a right to drug information directly from the
manufacturer.
The first is the right created by FDA regulations,
which required PPIs for all birth control devices and products. However, the courts have, with very few exceptions,
refused to recognize this right to information as a basis for
liability. In the area of contraceptives that cause death of
injury, the courts have continued to hold that the. duty of
an adequate warning by the manufacturer is discharged by
its warning of the hazards to the prescribing physician and
that there is no duty on the part of the manufacturer t6'
warn the patient of the hazards incurred in the use of the
products. This is despite the regulations which require PPIs
for these drugs. (This rule, however, was not applied in
Lukaszewicz v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 510 F. Supp.
961 11981), in which the oral contraceptive PPI requirement was held to create a duty to warn ultimate consumers.)

The courts have created their own exception to the
"adequate warning to physicians" rule. In Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories,498 F. 2d 1264 (1974), the court held the drug
company strictly liable for having marketed an unavoidably
unsafe oral polio vaccine without warning the ultimate consumer of the risks involved. The Vaccine was administered
-
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through a mass immunization program. The company argued that it had no duty to warn the ultimate consumer
of a prescription drug. Although the court agreed that it is
generally true that manufacturers of prescription drugs are
not required to warn the ultimate consumer, it also
recognized that this special standard is an exception to the
general rule that one who markets goods must warn the
foreseeable user and was made only because a medical expert could be expected to intervene in the choice of a
prescription drug. In this case, as in other massimmunization cases, the drug was not administered by a
doctor. The court held that the company had ample reason
to foresee the manner in which the drug would be administered and, in the absence of a "learned intermediary," had
a duty to warn the ultimate consumer. The absence of such
warning caused the imposition of strict liability on the
manufacturer.
Both the general rule (adequate warning to physician
discharges the manufacturer's duty to warn) and the courtcreated exception (warning must go to the ultimate consumer of the drug product when the manufacturer can reasonably foresee that it will be administered without the intervention of a "learned intermediary") assume a large role
for the prescribing physician. The rules assume that once
the physician receives adequate warning, he or she will
then inform the patient of any risks so that an optimally safe
and effective program of therapy and treatment can be
developed.
However, even the best-intentioned doctors would be
unable to adequately inform a patient if they do not have
sufficient information themselves.

Failures and Weaknesses in the Present System
Informing the Physician: Since 1961, the FDA has required
manufacturers to provide information to physicians regard-

"By establishing a rule requiring
manufacturers to warn the
ultimate consumer/patient in
simple and direct language,
patients will be able to participate
in their own treatment...."
I
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ing various aspects of their drug products. The FDAapproved insert defines indication for drug use, contraindications (circumstances under which the drug should
never be used), possible adverse reactions, and the warnings which are necessary for the best and safest use of the
drug. This is the only regulated and fully controlled source
of information on which the physician can rely, yet it does
not normally go to the physician. Although he or she may
request a copy of the insert, it usually goes to the pharmacist with a shipment of drugs and is discarded when the
medication is dispensed.
Yet the physician package inserts are generally accepted as evidence that a manufacturer has fulfilled its duty
to warn both doctors and consumers of potential hazards,
despite the fact that physicians rarely read the insert and
rely instead on the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR). The
PDR is essentially a privately published compilation of official package inserts. Although the inserts contained in the
PDR are regulated as labeling, it does not list all of the
drugs on the market. In addition, the inserts and PDR entries are often laced with advertisements, emphasis on the
positive aspects of the product and de-emphasis, if not deletion, of negative aspects.
The impact of overpromotion and "watered-down
warnings" is also seen in another source of information for
the doctor: the "detailman." In practice, the person responsible for most of the doctor's drug information is the
manufacturer's commission sales representative or "detailman." The detailman makes the rounds of practitioners' offices and encourages physicians to use their company's
products, as his or her own income is at least partially
dependent upon his or her sales volume. This creates an
obvious conflict of interest, and the courts have recognized
the impact of overpromotion, imposing liability .despite
otherwise adequate warnings when overpromotion subconsciously or unconsciously caused the doctor to disregardthe
warnings. However, a charge of "overpromotion" brings
with it serious problems of proof. Also, doctors often do
not take the time to meet with and listen to the manufacturer's representative as they consider it to be a wasteful
and unproductive use of otherwise valuable time, but the
courts continue to generally accept the sales representative
as an adequate means of informing the physician.
Due to the nature of the drug industry, the tremendous
rate at which new drug products are being developed, and
an apparent lack of extensive pharmacological training in
American medical schools, physicians have become increasingly dependent upon drug companies for information about
their products. The courts have recognized the failures and
weaknesses of this system but continue to support it. The
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courts also assume that once the doctor receives any drug
information he or she will, in turn, inform the ultimate consumer. This is typically not the case.
Historically, the doctor-patient relationship has been
based on a model of patient helplessness coupled with a
view of the doctor as a possessor of expert knowledge and
technical competence, enabling him or her to diagnose and
treat ailments about which the patient knows very little.
This view of the doctor as a professional has afforded her or
him professional autonomy from judicial scrutiny.
When a patient alleges that a lack of information has
negated any consent to treatment, the courts usually apply
a professional standard in examining the physician's conduct. The test asks what information the reasonable
medical practitioner would give to a patient, as opposed to
what information a reasonable person would want to have
in order to make an informed decision about his or her own
treatment. The professional standard is also used when a
doctor claims that disclosure would have increased or
created a risk and that he or she exercised a therapeutic
privilege in withholding the information.
There is a growing trend toward a "patient perspec,
tive" in requiring the disclosure of drug information by
physicians. This trend no doubt reflects the efforts of various consumer and patients rights organizations, yet it still
fails to guarantee that the ultimate consumer will receive
adequate warning. A physician cannot be expected to disclose risks of which he or she is unaware.
In sum, the present system of issuing warnings fails to
fully inform the ultimate consumers/patients of the risks of
drug therapy or to allow them to tak6 an active role in their
own treatment. This failure of the drug manufacturers lia,
bility doctrine can be repaired by, in effect, returning to the
reasoning behind the strict products liability doctrine. That
is, the party most likely to be aware of the risks involved
with the use of each drug should be required to provide
that information to the ultimate consumer/patient.
Such a rule is no more than a logical extension of the
court-created "mass immunization" exception. The current
system's reliance on a "learned intermediary" is misplaced,
in that doctors either may not have the information themselves or may fail to inform the patient. Requiring the
manufacturer to directly inform the ultimate consumer/
patient would accomplish two objectives. Not only would
such a requirement provide an extra "layer" of protection
to the patient but it would recognize the basic right of
"[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind.., to
determine what shall be done with his for her own body"
(Schoendorff v. Society of New Tork Hospital, 211 N.Y. 125,
opinion by Justice Cardozo).
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